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Abstract
In this paper an agri-food traceability system based
on public key cryptography and Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID) technology is proposed. In order
to guarantee safety in food, an efficient tracking and
tracing system is required. RFID devices allow
recording all useful information for traceability
directly on the commodity. The security issues are
discussed and two different methods based on public
cryptography are proposed and evaluated. The first
algorithm uses a nested RSA based structure to
improve security, while the second also provides
authenticity of data. An experimental analysis
demonstrated that the proposed system is well suitable
on PDAs too.
1. Introduction
Traceability can be considered a key factor in agri-
food sector. Improving tracking and tracing without
loosing data privacy is requested both by laws and
consumer organizations. In several countries laws on
traceability have been made during last years:
• in the USA, “Farm Security and Rural
Investment Act” requires country of origin labeling
for many kinds of food, including perishable
agricultural commodities [1];
• in EU, Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of The
European Parliament And of The Council of 28
January 2002 [2] establishes that food business
operators shall be able to identify, for the
competent authorities, any person who supplied
them with alimentary commodities, and any
business which takes food from them; they shall,
also, label adequately food, in order to facilitate
the traceability.
Agri-food companies often apply simple systems,
based on paper documents. Some systems exploit
barcode to identify commodities: by using the
identification number in the barcode, it is possible to
find, in the company database, the information about
the food. Today, new opportunities for the food
traceability come from the Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID) technology.
RFID is widely adopted as a contactless
identification technology. A typical RFID system is
made up of: a reader, which creates an electromagnetic
field, and some passive tags without an own voltage
supply. They can be read only if they are in the
interrogation zone of a reader which supplies the power
required through a coupling unit. Today, the size of the
RFID tag memory allows recording directly on every
commodity all useful information for the competent
authorities to trace it.
The use of RFID tags hazards the privacy. In the
USA, many organizations, such as Consumer Privacy
and Civil Liberties Organizations, are requesting
attention to privacy threats [3]. In Canada, the Annual
Report to Parliament 2005 of the Privacy
Commissioner underlines the importance to ensure that
RFIDs do not erode informational privacy rights [4]. In
EU, in compliance with the Working Document
adopted on 2005 by the European Data Protection
Working Party [5], the national authorities, set up to
protect personal information, established guidelines
needed for a safe use of RFID technology [6].
The privacy threads, arose from RFID, involve
dangers such as man tracking, personal belongings
monitoring and industrial espionage. 
Many solutions to the privacy problem have been
analyzed, some of them are: 
• killing the tag [7], a command can stop the tag
at the point-of-sale.
• using passwords or encryption [8], which try to
avoid unauthorized readings of the tag;
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• changing tag ID [9], the use of different IDs
makes difficult to recognize a tag;
• blocking the anti-collision system of the reader
[10], a special tag stops the correct functioning of
the reader.
This paper proposes a system which allows
competent authorities to manage alimentary traceability,
preventing new privacy problems. In this system, food
business operators shall record on the RFID tag
information on their treatments, in compliance with one
precise outline. The present size of the tag memory
allows using the whole memory for traceability, or
leaving a part for other independent aims, such as anti-
counterfeit [11] or marketing. Stored data will be
protected using the public key cryptography: every
operator will record its treatments and only the
competent authorities, using private-keys, will be able
to decrypt the information. In this way, by means of the
resulting ubiquitous data system, authorities could
immediately access information on alimentary
commodities under examination. The use of encryption
allows protecting the memory area of the traceability
system, without blocking the memory; it is, moreover,
possible to use additional privacy protection systems, in
order to ensure the privacy of the whole tag. To
improve the security level we propose two different
algorithms suitable for different situations:
• Nested Cryptography Algorithm (NCA), that
uses encapsulated ciphertexts in order to enhance
the security optimizing memory occupation;
• Authenticating Cryptography Algorithm
(ACA), that proves the authenticity of
information.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows:
in Section 2 background about traceability
management, privacy threats, RFID characteristics and
cryptography theory are introduced, while in Section 3
the traceability management system and the privacy
protection system are detailed. Finally, in Section 4,
system abilities and costs are evaluated. In Section 5
some conclusions are drawn.
2. Background
Within this section the description of privacy and
traceability management goes into more depth. Tags
properties are depicted, spotlighting different
nomenclature and current organization. In addition,
information theory for cryptosystems is introduced.
2.2. Traceability management
Rules about traceability and food label information
change according to the country. According to [2], food
business operators shall register the origin and the
destination of the alimentary commodities they manage,
and they shall label food to facilitate its traceability. In
general, alimentary operators shall track the food to
allow its tracing. A typical case of food tracking
management is shown in Fig. 1: 
• a producer, yields a commodity;
• a second operator buys the commodity,
registers the producer data, transforms the
commodity or joins it to other commodities and
registers its treatments;
• a distributor buys the commodity and registers
the previous operator data;
• a retailer buys the commodity and registers the
distributor data.
Figure 1. Agri-Food Tracking and Tracing
Whenever there are alimentary sophistications,
contamination or infection caused by damaged food, the
competent authorities control the retailer which sold
them; the operator must search in its own centralized
database to make available the information about its
treatments and to identify any person who supplied it
with food or any other substance included into the
commodity. Then, authorities repeat the procedure with
the next operator, and so forth. By using RFID tags to
label alimentary commodities, every operator could
write a copy of its data and of any other useful
information directly on the tag, transforming the
previous divided databases in only one ubiquitous
database, and making the authorities' work easier and
faster
2.3. Privacy Threats
Rules about privacy change according to the
country, as well. However in many countries there is a
great attention on privacy risks. There are many
privacy threats connected to RFID [12][13]:
AUTHORITY
CUSTOMER
suspicious
commodit
Trackin
Tracing
Producer 2nd Operator Distributor Retailer
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• The serial number of a tag can be associated
with the customer's identity, so it is possible to
monitor the customer or, knowing the object
identified by the serial number, to get information
for profiling. Besides knowing which object a
person buys, it is possible to know how often a
person uses it as well.
• Even without associating a tag number with a
person identity, a set of tags can track an
unidentified person, violating the “location
privacy” [14].
• The transfer of a tag from a set to another set
means that an object passes from a person to
another one, so it is possible to know that there is a
relation between those persons.
• By reading the tag’s memory, it could be
possible to know which commodities a person
possesses.
• Companies would like to keep private their
information, in order to avoid industrial espionage
and unauthorized monitoring of their sales.
Privacy threats, due to recording of the tracking
information on an RFID tag, are mainly the risk of
unauthorized readings of information about the
belongings of a person, and the industrial espionage. In
this paper a solution to these problems is proposed.
2.4. RFID Tag Properties and Organization
A tag is composed by a radio frequency interface
block, a memory component and a logic element. Tags
have usually no battery (passive ones), so they acquire
the power from the external radio frequency
communication. Otherwise, active tags have their own
power supply. Commonly, computational capacities are
extremely limited in a tag. The major concern of an
RFID reader consists in accessing the tag’s memory.
Memory, which plays an important role in the tag
architecture, may be a ROM or an EEPROM memory.
It contains the unique identification number and may
have up to several kilobits of storage capacity.
Operational frequency used in an RFID system may
vary from low frequencies (several kilohertz) to ultra
high frequencies (a couple of gigahertz). 
Despite the fact that some RFID tags are able to
perform cryptographic operations [15][16][17] because
of their internal logic circuitry, the majority of RFID
devices have not real capabilities for cryptanalysis
functions in part due to their power constraints. Most of
RFID tags are passive ones, with limited processor
performance and, hence, restricted computational
resources.
While first generation tags did not even have
memory for an identification number, current versions
may have several kilobits for user memory. Our
proposed traceability system is aimed for simple-
passive tags with user memory.
2.5. Cryptographic Theory
Cryptographic algorithms have been used for
decades in order to guarantee communication privacy.
The proposed privacy system uses RSA [18] algorithm,
that is based on public key cryptography, firstly
presented in [19]. Many other applicable algorithms
based on public-key cryptography have been proposed
in the literature: El Gamal scheme [20], Knapsack
scheme [21], Rabin scheme [22].
In a public key cryptosystem, given a pair of
families {EK}K∈{K} and {DK}K∈{K} of algorithms
representing inverting transformations, EK:{M} → {M}
and  DK:{M} → {M}, on a finite message space {M},
the following must be true:
• for every K ∈ {K}, EK is the inverse of DK,
• for every K ∈ {K} and M ∈ {M}, algorithms
EK and DK are easy to compute,
• for almost every K ∈ {K}, each algorithm
equivalent to DK is computationally infeasible to
derive from EK,
• for every K ∈ {K}, it is feasible to compute
inverse pairs EK and DK from K.
Therefore, by making K = Ko, a pair of ciphering
functions DKo and EKo are fixed. The third property
allows making public the key EKo without compromising
the security of the secret key DKo. In this way, a
plaintext message P ∈ {M}, may be ciphered by means
of the public key. The result is a ciphertext message C
∈ {M} that can be deciphered using the secret key.
Thus, the following relation is true, C = EKo(P) =
EKo(DKo(C)).
Secret and public keys are generated by means of
the RSA algorithm as follows. Two large prime
numbers n and p are chosen. The number of elements q
in GF(q) is computed by multiplying n and p. A
random value E, relatively prime to (n – 1)(p – 1), is
picked. Subsequently, the number D is calculated
D=[k(n – 1)(p – 1)+1]/E, with k chosen in order to
make D an integer number. Private algorithm is defined
as
DKo (P) = PD mod q = C, (1)
and the public algorithm as
EKo (C) = CE mod q = P. (2)
To avoid risks from chosen plaintext attacks and
chosen ciphertext attacks, RSA is normally combined
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with a padding scheme, such as OAEP [23]. The OAEP
processes the plaintext prior to encryption in order to
convert the RSA deterministic encryption scheme in a
probabilistic scheme, and to prevent partial decryption
of the plaintext.
The properties of the public key cryptosystem can
be obtained exploiting the apparent difficulty of
computing logarithms over a finite Galois Field with a
number q of elements. Security is measured
accordingly with the computational complexity of
calculating the logarithmic operation. While it is
widely believed that breaking the RSA encryption
scheme is as difficult as factoring the modulus q, no
such equivalence has proven [24].
While enlarging q improves system security, it also
places constraints within computational time. The time
required to calculate ciphering and deciphering
functions is augmented mainly because of the size of
the numeric values involved in the computation.
Normally, a reasonable value for q should be on the
order of 21024. Considering that regular bit length for
numerical values is, at most, 64 bits in a computing
system, appropriate algorithms should be used to
manage 1024 bit or bigger values.
3. Traceability Management System
RFID tags could be defined as an unsecured
channel, since they are a means of conveying
information that intruders have the ability to read. In
our system every operator in the agri-food chain has to
write information about its treatments in a specific area
of the commodity tag. Unfortunately, unauthorized
persons can read tag information to know which kind
of commodities an individual owns or to spy a
competitor. As to address the privacy needs of a
system, unauthorized readings of the tag memory
should be forbidden. The traceability management and
privacy protection system are described in the
following.
3.2. General Architecture
At the present time, in order to find the operators
that treated a commodity, the authorities have to follow
a trail of breadcrumbs. They find the first operator and
then they have to trace back, step by step, in order to
detect any other.
In order to make easier authorities' work, we
propose to create a ubiquitous tracking database, by
labeling the alimentary commodities with an RFID tag.
Every operator of the chain controls a part of the tag
memory (memory slot) and it has to record its own data
and its treatments information on it. In this way all the
traceability information are immediately available to
the competent authorities.
The tag memory is divided, at logic level, in a
sufficient number of areas, to allow a sufficient number
of operators to write. On the other hand, the size of a
memory slot, that corresponds to the Maximum
Allowed Information Size (MAIS) of each operator,
must be large enough to store all its data. An accurate
template is needed to streamline the use of the memory
space. In way of employing a smaller memory area than
using strings of characters, information must be
translated in numerical codes. The use of codes to
implement the traceability is under study also by EAN
[25]. Codes have to identify operators, their geographic
zone, their sector, the kind of commodity and the
executed treatment types. The competent authority will
fill in a reference table for any kind of code:
• identification codes (IDC) reference tables; a
group of three tables that identifies the operator:
o geographic code (GC) reference table; the
first part of the code identifies the country, the
second the region, and the last the
municipality; the authorities, by using this
code, can immediately identify the origin of a
commodity;
o sector code (SC) reference table; the
sector code defines the kind of operator, e.g.
“farmer” or “distributor”;
o operator identification (OID) reference
table; this code identifies the single operator;
• commodity code (CC) reference table; this
code identifies the kind of commodity; it is useful
when a food is made by different elements;
• treatment code (TC) reference tables; in every
sector a table holds the list of the relevant
operations, and their codes.
An operator must also write the IDC of its supplier,
in order to enhance system reliability against frauds.
In the agri-food chain the commodity follows
different steps. Initially the producer stores its data into
the first memory slot. Step by step each operator adds
its data. The following situation may modify the initial
product:
• Simple treatment; the operator adds its data at
the bottom of previous information.
• Merge of commodities; if the number of
available memory slots is enough, the operator
copies the information of all the old tags in the
new one. If information regarding the
commodities would overfill the memory, it writes
only a summary, including a header (the summary
special area identifier flag) and the identification
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codes of suppliers that matched to commodity
codes. Then the operator adds its data at the
bottom of previous information.
• Partition of a commodity; the operator adds its
data at the bottom of previous information, and it
tags all the new commodities.
Operators must put in a database the data contained
in all tags, in order to be able to prove, in case of an
authorities' inspection, their propriety.
3.3. Privacy Protection System
We elaborated two cryptographic algorithms,
adapted to different contexts. Both the algorithms are
based on RSA algorithm. The two algorithms are
presented in sections 3.4 and 3.5. 
Periodically the competent authorities establish a
set of Authority Public Keys (APuKs) and Authority
Private Keys (APrKs) with different lengths, and
distribute public key set to all operators.
For the common part of the algorithms, every
operator encrypts a plaintext, by using one of the
authority public keys, and it writes the resulting
ciphertext in the appropriate memory area. The
authorities can decrypt the ciphertext by using the
private keys coupled to the public keys used by the
operator. By changing private and public keys
periodically, authorities can increase security; in fact,
an unauthorized entity which finds some private keys
could use them for a short period of time while
authorities can decrypt old and new ciphertexts.
3.4. Nested Cryptographic Algorithm (NCA)
This system uses pairs of APuK and APrK of
different length. To understand the benefit of using
different key lengths, it is important to remember that
enhancing the length of the keys increases security and
ciphertext size. Each operator uses a particular APuK
depending on its position in the chronological sequence
of the production chain (increasing numbers, e.g., 1 for
the farmer, and so on). The MAIS is the same for all
operators. The tag memory is, at logical level, divided
in slots with this size. The description of this algorithm
is shown in the Fig. 2.
The first operator has the shortest key, the length of
its key is equal to the MAIS. Its information is
encrypted by the first APuK, and the relative ciphertext
is written in the first memory slot.
The length of any operator APuK is equal to the
MAIS multiplied by the number of the operator
position in the chain. All operators, subsequent to the
first one, compose their plaintext adding their
information to the bottom of the previous ciphertext.
After the encryption, operators write the new ciphertext
in the first part of the memory tag, occupying a number
of memory slots equal to the operator position. The last
operator, theoretically the retailer, uses always the last
and longest key. Its ciphertext occupies all the memory
slots.
Figure 2.  NCA Algorithm
At each chain ring the security grows. In the first
part of the chain there is not a high security, the privacy
of customers is not in danger, but the protection of
information on the first businesses is low. Instead, out
of the production chain, the security is to the maximum
level.
Authorities decrypt, one by one, all the ciphertexts
by using the correct private key.
3.5. Authenticating Cryptographic Algorithm
(ACA)
In this system, there is only one APuK and one
APrK. The memory slot size and, consequently the
MAIS, is the same for all operators.
The scope of this system is to ensure also the
authenticity of the message. Periodically every operator
establishes its own Operator Private Key (OPrK) and
Nth Operator
Second Operator
First Operator
Tot: Total Used Memory Area
K: Memory Slot's Area
1st CT
First Plaintext = First Operator's Data
First Ciphertext (k bits)
First key (k bits)
... ..................
2nd CT
Second Plaintext = First Ciphertext + Second Operator's Data
Second Ciphertext (2*k bits)
Second key (2*k bits)
..................
LAST CIPHERTEXT 
 Nth and Last Plaintext = Nth-1 Ciphertext + Nth Operator's Data
Last Ciphertext (Tot bits)
Last key (Tot bits)
...
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Operator Public Key (OPuK), and sends the OPuK to
the authority. The pair of keys of the operator is used to
prove the authenticity of the message. The description
of this algorithm is shown in the Fig. 3.
Figure 3. ACA Algorithm
The first step for operators is to translate their data
by their OPrK. Since the OPrK is secret, only the
authentic operator can write the cipherdata which can
be decrypted by using its OPuK.
Every operator subsequent to the first erases the
memory slot that contains the IDC of the previous
operator.
Each operator encrypts its cipherdata and writes the
resulting ciphertext in the first free memory slot, which
contained the previous operator IDC.
The last step of every operator is to encrypt its IDC
by using the APuK, and to write the resulting text in the
first subsequent free memory slot. 
Authorities decrypt the last used memory slot by
using the APrK. In this slot there is the IDC of the last
operator. The previous slot is decrypted by using the
APrK and then by using the OPuK that is related to the
IDC. Since all operators write the IDC of its supplier,
authorities know what OPuK is correct to decrypt the
previous memory slot.
This system protects from frauds by proving the
message originality. The security level depends on the
memory slot size.
4. Experimental Results
We experimentally evaluated the proposed
technique implementing a prototype. Initially we filled
out part of the code reference tables, sufficient to test
the system. The simulation allowed knowing the
performance time of the system and the differences
among the cryptography algorithms. 
To put into operation the system, the authorities
need an RFID reader for mobile devices and a PDA
with the reading software. The agri-food operators need
an RFID reader to write on the tag. A small reader for
mobile devices and a PDA with the writing software is
enough as well. To increase the efficiency it is possible
to use PCs with appropriate readers, instead. We used
the following resources:
• RFID tag: SRIX4K from STMicroelectronics,
passive tag, compliant with ISO14443, frequency
13.56 MHz, EEPROM with 4 kbits.
• RFID reader: ACG Dual ISO CF Card Reader
Module from ACG, compliant with ISO14443,
frequency 13.56 Mhz.
• Computing system: PDA with a 624 MHz Intel
PXA270 processor.
In the simulation we use the whole memory, of
4096 bits, for the traceability system.
Table 1 shows the composition of the data in a
memory slot. The first 10 bytes identify the commodity
and the operator, the subsequent byte shows the
number of treatments. Then each group of 7 bytes
describes a treatment and its time.
Table 1. Memory Slot
Name Code Bytes
Geographic code - nation GC1 1
Geographic code - region GC2 1
Geographic code - city GC3 2
Sector code SC 2
Operator identification OID 2
Commodity code CC 2
Number of treatments NoT 1
Treatment code – first one 1st TC 7
Treatment code – nth one Nth TC 7
Supplier IDC SIDC 8
In the NCA algorithm we set the MAIS to 512 bit,
so a slot can hold at most 6 treatment codes. There are
8 keys, from 512 bit to 4096.
In the ACA algorithm we set the MAIS to 1024 bit.
The security level depends on the length of the keys, so
the MAIS is a compromise between the security and
the number of memory slot.
We implemented the software by using a not
optimized implementation of RSA algorithm, so the
processing time cannot show the real performance of
the system, but it can show the differences when using
different key lengths. The authorities’ check of a
Nth Operator
Nth Plaintext = Nth Operator's Cipherdata
Nth Ciphertext (k bits)
APuK (k bits) N
th
 Operator's IDC
APuK (k bits)
Nth Operator's Data
Nth OPrK (k bits)
Nth-3 CT Nth-2 CT .........IDCNth CTNth-1 CT
K: Memory Slot's Area
APuK: Authority Public Key
OPrK: Operator Private Key
IDC Ciphertext (k bits)
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memory slot, encrypted using a 512 bits key, in the
NCA is completed in 3800 ms, in the ACA in 3930 ms,
3500 of which are spent by the decryption algorithm.
Operators in the NCA employ 500 ms to entirely
generate and write their ciphertext, in the ACA 3930
ms, the encryption needs on the order of 130 ms to be
concluded. Anyway, by using a PC, with a Pentium 4 at
3.20 GHz processor, the decryption needs 62 ms and
the encryption 1 ms; with a 4096 bit key the decryption
needs 4125 ms, the encryption 31 ms. The difference
between encryption and decryption comes from the use
of a very optimized public key. Figures 4 and 5 show
the encryption/decryption time. Although, this time
table results from the simplicity of the used algorithm
implementation; we did not attempt to improve it since
its characteristics are not part of this paper objectives. 
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Figure 4. PDA Encryption/Decryption Time
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Figure 5. PC Encryption/Decryption Time
5. Conclusion
Today, an efficient management of the traceability
is necessary; RFID technology offers the possibility to
implement a rapid and effective ubiquitous system.
Unfortunately, recording operators and commodity data
on a RFID tag involves, in addition to standard RFIDs
privacy problems, the risk of unauthorized readings of
information about the belongings of a person, and
industrial espionage. However, privacy can be
protected by using an opportune cryptosystem:
algorithms presented in this paper produce a
satisfactory reply to these privacy problems. 
Even considering the possible optimization of the
cryptography algorithm implementation, the decryption
time requires the use of a PC, while the encryption can
be made simply by a PDA. The ACA implies one
encryption and one decryption for any operation, so,
unless using short keys, it requires a PC. 
In the NCA it is not possible to lock an area until
the subsequent operators have written on the tag, while
the ACA requires larger tag memory to ensure a high
level of security, but it allows locking a memory slot,
after recording on it.
In order to increase the protection from fraud, also
in the NCA it is possible to use the authenticating
system, but it involves the management of a great
number of keys and it extends the operation time.
Our traceability system, with a suitable RSA
implementation, can satisfy efficiency and privacy
demands. Future work involves the practical
implementation of the proposed algorithms in a wine
bottling chain. We think it could address the safety of
alimentary commodities, improving actual standards.
This work was partially supported by “Progetto
Regionale Ricerca Applicata 2004” and by
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